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REHEARING ISSUE
Whether this Court's decision in Bluemel v. State, 2006 UT APP 141,
issued on April 14, 2006 is in accordance with established Utah case law
precedent. Specifically, the issue the State seeks rehearing is: Whether the
Court was correct in holding that a trial court's failure to strictly follow Rule
11 in accepting a guilty plea is sufficient to grant relief under the Utah PostConvictions Remedies Act?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On September 20, 2001, Ms. Bluemel was charged with seven counts
of rape, a first degree felony, and one count of supplying alcohol to a minor.
R. 61-62. On December 5, 2001, Ms. Bluemel offered a guilty plea to three
counts of rape and one count of supplying alcohol to a minor. The
remaining counts were dismissed. R. 50. The trial court did not properly
incorporate the plea statement into the record. Bluemel v. State, 2006 UT
App 141, f 15. The trial court did not inform Ms. Bluemel of all of the Rule
11(e) factors and rights, and only asked Ms. Bluemel if she had any
questions about the statement. Bluemel v. State, 2006 UT App 141, ^[ 15-16.
The trial court failed to inform Ms. Bluemel of her right to the presumption
of innocence, that the State carried the burden of proving her guilty beyond a
1

reasonable doubt, that her plea is an admission of all those elements, and that
she had the right to compel the attendance of defense witnesses. Bluemel,
2006 UT App 141, ^[ 16. Ms. Bluemel informed her attorney that she wished
to file an appeal, in which her attorney informed her it was being handled.
After an appeal was not filed, Ms. Bluemel sought present counsel. Counsel
filed a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, which was denied by the trial
court. Ms. Bluemel appealed to this Court and this Court found that the trial
court erred by dismissing her petition. Bluemel, 2006 UT App 141, ^ 18.
The State then filed this Petition for Rehearing.

ARGUMENT
The Appellee, the State of Utah, has filed a Petition for Rehearing in
the above captioned matter on the grounds that this Court's holding in
Bluemel was contrary to established Utah case law precedent. Blueme v.
Statel, 2006 UT App 141. Ms. Bluemel's petition for post-conviction relief
based on Rule 11 violations falls under the interest of justice exception, and
therefore is proper under the statute. This Court's ruling in Bluemel is also
in accordance with established case law in that a trial court's failure to
strictly comply with Rule 11 is a constitutional violation subject to relief
under the Post-Conviction Relief Act (PCRA). Therefore, this Court should
deny Appellee's Petition for Rehearing.
2

To obtain relief under the PCRA, a petitioner must seek relief "within
one year after the cause of action has accrued." Utah Code Ann. § 78-35 a107(1) (2002). But if a court "finds that the interests of justice require, a
court may excuse a petitioner's failure to file within the time limitations." Id.
§ 78-35a-107(3). The PCRA contains an explicit bar to any petition that is
not brought within one year of the cause of action accruing, but the
limitations period is not absolute. It contains a safety valve providing the
district court with discretion to excuse any untimely filing when the interests
of justice so require. Ms. Bluemel filed a petition for post-conviction relief
outside of the one year time limit, however, this Court found that the interest
of justice exception to the one year time limit was met based on the trial
court's failure to strictly comply with Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
Ms. Bluemel's petition for post-conviction relief is proper under
Section 78-35a-104 which states that:
"1) Unless precluded by Section 78-35a-106 or 78-35a-107, a
person who has been convicted and sentenced for a criminal
offense may file an action in the district court of original
jurisdiction for post-conviction relief to vacate or modify the
conviction or sentence upon the following grounds:
(a) the conviction was obtained or the sentence was
imposed in violation of the United States Constitution or
Utah Constitution;
(b) the conviction was obtained under a statute that is in
violation of the United States Constitution or Utah
3

Constitution, or the conduct for which the petitioner was
prosecuted is constitutionally protected;
(c) the sentence was imposed in an unlawful manner, or
probation was revoked in an unlawful manner; ..."
Section 78-35a-104. Under subsection (a), Ms. Bluemel's petition was
proper because her entry of a guilty plea did not conform to Rule 11 of the
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. This violation amounted to a
constitutional violation of Ms. Bluemel's rights. The trial court did not
properly incorporate the plea statement into the record, and during the plea
colloquy, the trial court only asked Ms. Bluemel if she had any questions
about the statement. Blueme v. Statel, 2006 UT App 141, f 151. The trial
court never asked Ms. Bluemel if she actually read, understood, and
acknowledged her plea statement, or made any other inquiry. Id. at ^ 15.
The trial court also failed to inform Ms. Bluemel of all of the Rule 11(e)
factors and rights. Id. at \ 16. Because of this severe deficiency, this Court
found that Ms. Bluemel's constitutional rights had been violated.
In support of its Petition for Rehearing, the State cites Salazar, which
applies to writs for habeas corpus and not for petitions for post-conviction
relief based on Rule 11 violations. Salazar v. Warden, 852 P.2d 988 (Utah
1993). In Salazar, the court found that Salazar's attorneys had made his plea
knowingly and voluntarily. Id. at 991. The court stated: "[bjecause we hold
1

Attached hereto as Addendum A
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that a Rule 11 violation does not warrant habeas corpus relief absent the
deprivation of a constitutional right, we affirm without treating the
compliance issue." Id. at 991. This statement by the court was followed
with a reference to footnote 6, where the court further stated: "We stress
that we are not retreating from our holding in State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d
1309 (Utah 1987), restated in State v. Maguire, 830 P.2d 216, 217 (Utah
1992), that the trial court must strictly comply with Rule 11. If this were a
direct appeal from denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, for example,
failure to strictly comply with the Rule would be grounds for reversal." Id.
at 991, FN 6. In Gibbons, the court stated: "Rule 11(e) squarely places on
trial courts the burden of ensuring that constitutional and Rule 11(e)
requirements are complied with when a guilty plea is entered." State v.
Gibbons 740 P.2d 1309, 1312 (Utah 1987). The basis for that duty is found
in Boykin v. Alabama where the United States Supreme Court stated: "What
is at stake for an accused facing [punishment] demands the utmost solicitude
of which courts are capable in canvassing the matter with the accused to
make sure he has a full understanding of what the plea connotes and of its
consequence." Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243-44, 89 S.Ct. 1709,
1712-13, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969). Therefore, the State's reliance on Salazar
is misplaced because the petition for post-conviction relief was based upon a

5

Rule 11 violation, not a writ for habeas corpus. If Ms. BluemePs petition
was based upon a writ for habeas corpus, then Salazar would be controlling.
However, this is not the case, therefore Gibbons is controlling and a
violation of Rule 11 is a constitutional violation. (Although this Court has
stated that mere procedural violations of Rule 11 do not rise to the level of a
constitutional violation, the trial court's clear failure to inform Ms. Bluemel
of her constitutional rights when accepting her guilty plea is well beyond a
mere procedural error. Therefore the State's argument is unpersuasive.)
Pursuant to the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure:
"(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest
or guilty and mentally ill, and may not accept the plea until the
court has found:
(e)(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he
or she has knowingly waived the right to counsel and
does not desire counsel;
(e)(2) the plea is voluntarily made;
(e)(3) the defendant knows of the right to the
presumption of innocence, the right against compulsory
self-incrimination, the right to a speedy public trial
before an impartial jury, the right to confront and crossexamine in open court the prosecution witnesses, the
right to compel the attendance of defense witnesses, and
that by entering the plea, these rights are waived;
(e)(4)(A) the defendant understands the nature and
elements of the offense to which the plea is entered, that
upon trial the prosecution would have the burden of
proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable
doubt, and that the plea is an admission of all those
elements;
(e)(4)(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual
basis is sufficient if it establishes that the charged crime
6

was actually committed by the defendant or, if the
defendant refuses or is otherwise unable to admit
culpability, that the prosecution has sufficient evidence to
establish a substantial risk of conviction;
(e)(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum
sentence, and if applicable, the minimum mandatory
nature of the minimum sentence, that may be imposed for
each offense to which a plea is entered, including the
possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences;
(e)(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea
discussion and plea agreement, and if so, what agreement
has been reached;
(e)(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits
for filing any motion to withdraw the plea; and
(e)(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of
appeal is limited.
These findings may be based on questioning of the defendant
on the record or, if used, a written statement reciting these
factors after the court has established that the defendant has
read, understood, and acknowledged the contents of the
statement."
Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure (emphasis added). The trial
court's failure to strictly comply with Rule 11 amounts to a constitutional
violation under the Utah Constitution and the U.S. Constitution. The Utah
Supreme Court requires trial courts to comply strictly with Rule 11 when
accepting guilty pleas. State v. Lehi 73 P.3d 985, 989 (Utah.App., 2003);
See also State v. Maguire, 830 P.2d 216, 217 (Utah 1992). In Mora, the
court found that during the plea colloquy, the trial court failed to inform
Mora that, if he chose to go to trial, the State carried the burden of proving
him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Mora 69 P.3d 838, 842-843

7

(Utah App. 2003). "The right to require the State to prove guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt is guaranteed by the due process clauses of the Utah and
the United States Constitutions." Id. at 842-843; See State v. Lopes, 1999
UT 24,^[ 13, 980 P.2d 191 (holding that "as both a state and federal
constitutional matter, we conclude that due process requires that the
prosecution prove every element of the charged crimes beyond a reasonable
doubt" (citing Utah Const. Art. I, § 7; U.S. Const. Amends. V, XIV) (other
citations omitted)). "If the defendant is not fully informed of his rights prior
to pleading guilty, then the guilty plea cannot be voluntary." State v. Hittle,
2002 UT App 134,1f 10, 47 P.3d 101 (applying plain error test to Rule 11
violation), cert, granted, 59 P.3d 603 (Utah 2002). "We cannot accept an
involuntary guilty plea and still claim to have done justice." Id.

Ms.

Bluemel's guilty plea was accepted by the trial court without strict
compliance with Rule 11, and under Utah case law, this amounts to a
constitutional violation.
By failing to follow Rule 11, the trial court violated Ms. Bluemel's
constitutional rights. "Several federal constitutional rights are involved in a
waiver that takes place when a plea of guilty is entered in a state criminal
trial. First, is the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination guaranteed
by the Fifth Amendment and applicable to the States by reason of the

8
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-~/r. Salazarv. Warden, 852 V Jd

uiit addressed this issue in Lclri:

"We acknowledge the case of Salazar v, '"Warden, 8D2 r.zd 988
(Utah 1993), in which the Utah Supreme Court did not limit
itself to the plea record described in the preceding text. It held:
"[A] court... is not limited to the record ofthe plea hearing but
may look at the surrounding facts and circumstances, including
the information the petitioner received from his or her attorneys
before entering the plea.,f Id. at 992. However, Salazar is
inapplicable here because it was not a Rule ! 1 case. It was a
habeas corpus case, involving the issue of whether the
defendant had been deprived of a constitutional right, see id JII
991, which is "more than a violation ofthe prophylactic
provisions of Rule
-./. at 092. Accord Haase v. United
States, 800 F.2d 123,127 (7th Cir.1986); State ex rel Vernatter
v. Warden, 207 WA a M , 528 S.E.2d 207, 215-16 (1999). The
Court explicitly distinguished "collateral attack" cases like
Salazar from cases involving "a direct appeal from denial of .J
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motion to withdraw a guilty plea." 852 P.2d at 991 n. 6. Since it
was looking for a violation of constitutional magnitude, the
Salazar court did not restrict itself to reviewing only the plea
record. Tellingly, the Utah Supreme Court has never applied
Salazarfs expanded-record standard to a pure Rule 11 case. The
Court's post-Salazar Rule 11 cases have restricted themselves
to the more limited record we have described. See, e.g., State v.
Thurman, 911 P.2d 371, 374 (Utah 1996). Some of this court's
Rule 11 cases may have slightly misconstrued Salazar, citing it
for the proposition that it does apply to Rule 11 cases. See, e.g.,
State v. Ostler, 2000 UT App 28,% 17, 996 P.2d 1065, aff d on
other grounds, 2001 UT 68, 31 P.3d 528; State v. Stilling, 856
P.2d 666, 674-75 (Utah Ct.App.1993) (addressing Rule 11 in
the context of an Alford plea)."
State v. Lehi 73 P.3d 985, 989 FN 3 (Utah.App., 2003). Therefore, this
Court's decision is not against established case law; it falls in line with an
established precedent that in appeals based on Rule 11 violations, the record
is limited. This Court has stated that in Salazar, the Utah Supreme Court
looked to circumstantial evidence in order to determine whether a
constitutional violation besides Rule 11 was committed. However, it is still
well settled that a trial court must strictly comply with Rule 11 and that the
record on appeal for a Rule 11 violation is limited.
Since the State's reliance on Salazar is inapplicable because the
present involves a direct appeal on a Rule 11 violation and not a habeas
corpus writ, and because the Court's ruling in Bluemel is in accordance with
established case law precedent, the Petition for Rehearing should be denied.

10
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Before'Judges Bench, McHugh7 and Orme,
BENCH, Presiding Judge:
Hi
Tammy Bluemel appeals the dismissal of her petition for
post-conviction relief. The trial court concluded that the
petition was untimely filed and did not constitute an interestsof-justice exception under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act
(PCRA). See Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-107 (Supp. 2005). We
reverse and remand for further proceedings.
BACKGROUND
]\2
Between October 1998 and April lyyy, Bluemel allegedly
engaged in sexual intercourse with her fourteen-year-old foster
son on several occasions and, in one instance, gave him alcohol.
Bluemel was charged with seven counts of rape, all first degree
felonies, see Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-402 (2003), and one count of
supplying alcohol to a minor, a class A misdemeanor, see Utah
Code Ann. § 32A-12-203 (2003),
f3
With the assistance of her trial counsel, Bluemel negotiated
a plea agreement, which was reduced to writing as a plea

statement. The plea statement indicated that Bluemel agreed to
plead guilty to three counts of rape and one count of supplying
alcohol to a minor, while the State agreed to dismiss the other
four counts of rape. The plea statement referenced the
consequences of entering a guilty plea and discussed basic
constitutional rights, such as the right to a jury trial, the
right to presumption of innocence, and the State's burden of
proof. The plea statement also declared that Bluemel waived
these constitutional rights and that she voluntarily entered her
pleas. Further, the plea statement indicated that Bluemel read
and understood the plea statement, that she was "not under the
influence of any drugs, medication, or intoxicants," and that she
"knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily enter[ed] " her pleas.
f4
During her arraignment, the trial court1 informed Bluemel
that "[b]efore I can accept your pleas, you have certain
[c]onstitutional [r]ights that you need to waive. They are
talked about in that statement in advance of plea. Do you have
any questions about the statement?" Bluemel indicated that she
did not have any questions about the plea statement. The trial
court went on to ask Bluemel if she understood her constitutional
rights and that she would be waiving them. Bluemel responded
affirmatively. The trial court then informed Bluemel "that if
you wish to withdraw these pleas you need to make a motion in
writing to do that within [thirty] days of sentencing" and that
the court "would not automatically grant that motion." Bluemel
acknowledged that she understood. The trial court then stated,
"[s]o if you do intend to plea, then let's have you sign the
[plea] statement." Bluemel, her attorney, the prosecutor, and
the trial judge all signed the plea statement. Bluemel then
verbally entered on the record her guilty pleas to three counts
of rape and one count of supplying alcohol to a minor. The trial
court accepted the pleas and found that "Bluemel ha[d] knowingly
and voluntarily entered her pleas."
U5
On March 27, 2002, Bluemel was sentenced to three
indeterminate terms of not less than five years to life and one
indeterminate term not to exceed one year, all of which would run
concurrently. Bluemel was immediately taken into custody and
remains incarcerated.
H6
Immediately following her sentencing, Bluemel allegedly
informed her trial counsel that she wanted to appeal. Her trial
1. Judge Guy R. Burningham, who has since retired, presided over
Bluemel's arraignment in 2001. Later, in 2005, Judge James R.
Taylor presided over and dismissed Bluemel's petition for postconviction relief. For ease of reference, we refer to both
judges as "the trial court."

20050208-CA

2

counsel, allegedly advised. Bluemel that he would, handle her appeal
and informed her that she had one year to file her appeal.
During her first year in prison, her trial counsel allegedly
visited her three times and continually informed her that he was
still working on her appeal. Bluemel later attempted to contact
her trial counsel concerning the status of her appeal, but he
refused to respond to her communications. After one year,
Bluemel sought other legal counsel and hired her current counsel
in October 2003. After meeting with Bluemel and reviewing the
matter, her current counsel filed the petition on May 3, 2004,
over two years after her sentencing date. The State moved for
dismissal of the petition because it was untimely and did not
qualify under the interests-of-justice exception. The trial
court dismissed Bluemel's petition and now she appeals the
dismissal.
ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1J7
Bluemel argues that the trial court erred in dismissing her
petition for post-conviction relief as untimely because her
circumstances come within the interests-of-justice exception
under the PCRA. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-107. Bluemel
asserts that she did not enter knowing and voluntary pleas and
received ineffective assistance of counsel, either of which
warrants post-conviction relief. Dismissal of a petition for
post-conviction relief is reviewed "'for correctness without
deference to the [trial] court's conclusions of law,1" Gardner
v. Galetka, 2004 UT 42,^7, 94 P.3d 263 (quoting Rudolph v.
Galetka, 2-002 UT 7,*-: '2 P.:M -67). .
ANALYSIS
f8
"[T]he legislature enacted the PCRA to 'establish[] a
substantive legal remedy for any person who challenges a
conviction or sentence for a criminal offense.*" id. at: %9
(second alteration in original) (quoting Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-35a-102(1) (2002)), Under the PCRA, a person may file a
petition for post-conviction relief within one year after "the
last day for filing an appeal from the entry of the final
judgment of conviction if no appeal is taken." Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-35a-107(2)(a). However, an untimely filing may be excused
" [i ] f the court finds that the interests of justice ^ c 1
require." IcL. § 78-35a-107(3).
H9
Bluemel argues that her circumstances in this matter fit
within the PCRA's interests-of-justice exception, and that her
petition should not have been dismissed. Bluemel claims the
exception should be recognized here because (1 ) she did not: enter
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knowing and voluntary pleas and (2) she received ineffective
assistance of counsel throughout the course of the trial court
proceedings. In support of her claim that she did not enter
knowing and voluntary pleas, Bluemel argues that the trial court
failed to strictly comply with rule 11 of the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure. See Utah R. Crim. P. II. 2
flO "The procedures for entering a guilty plea are set forth in
rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure." State v.
Benvenuto, 1999 UT 60,til, 983 P.2d 556; see also Utah R. Crim.
P. 11. "The plea-taking proceedings [in rule 11] are intended to
insure that a defendant who pleads guilty knowingly and
voluntarily waives the protections the constitution guarantees
him or her prior to a trial verdict." State v. Stilling, 856
P.2d 666, 671 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). "A guilty plea must be
knowingly and voluntarily made in order to protect a defendant's
due process rights." Id. "It is well established under Utah law
that we will presume harm . . . when a trial court fails to
inform a defendant of his constitutional rights under rule 11."
State v. Mora, 2003 UT App 117,1(22, 69 P.3d 838 (omission in
original) (citation and quotations omitted). "We presume harm
because, by not knowing which rights a defendant is waiving, the
defendant cannot make a fully informed decision." Id. (citation
and quotations omitted). "If the defendant is not fully informed
of his rights prior to pleading guilty, then the guilty plea
cannot be voluntary. We cannot accept an involuntary guilty plea
and still claim to have done justice." Id. (citation and
quotations omitted).
fll Under Utah law, the trial court bears the burden of ensuring
strict compliance with rule 11. See State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d
1309, 1312-13 (Utah 1987), appeal after remand on other grounds,
779 P.2d 1133 (Utah 1989). "This means 'that the trial court
[must] personally establish that the defendant's guilty plea is
truly knowing and voluntary and establish on the record that the
defendant knowingly waived his or her constitutional rights. 1 "
State v. Visser, 2000 UT 88,1[llf 22 P.3d 1242 (alteration in
original) (quoting State v. Abeyta, 852 P.2d 993, 995 (Utah
1993)). Although the trial court has "a duty of 'strict1
compliance" with rule 11, strict compliance "does not mandate a
particular script or rote recitation of the rights listed." Id.
In Visser, the Utah Supreme Court "reemphasize[d] that the
2. Because our decision that the trial court did not strictly
comply with rule 11 by failing to inform Bluemel of certain
constitutional rights is dispositive, we need not address her
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel nor Bluemel's argument
concerning the influence of prescription medications, which
allegedly prevented her from sufficiently understanding her plea.
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substantive goal of rule 11 is to ensure that defendants know of
their rights and thereby understand the basic consequences of
their decision to plead guilty. That goal should not be
overshadowed or undermined by formalistic ritual." Id.
fl2 Rule 11(e) identifies specific rights and factors of which
the trial court must inform the defendant. See Utah R. Crim. P.
11(e). These include, among other things, that the plea is
voluntary, the right to presumption of innocence, the right to
counsel, the right against compulsory self-incrimination, the
right to a speedy trial before a jury, the right to confront and
cross-examine witnesses, and that the defendant waives these
rights. See id. Rule 11(e) also requires that the "defendant
understand [] the nature and elements of the offense to which the
plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the
burden of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable
doubt, and that the plea is an admission of all those elements."
Id.
Hl3 In determining whether a defendant is informed of his or her
rights, properly understands them, and voluntarily waives them,
the trial court must engage in a plea colloquy with the
defendant. See id. Rule 11 provides two avenues whereby the
trial court may properly engage in a plea colloquy. The trial
court may (1) verbally question the defendant on the record
regarding each of the factors and rights described in rule 11(e)
or (2) receive a written plea statement from the defendant
regarding each of the rights and factors. See id. The plea
statement is "used to promote efficiency during a plea colloquy."
Mora, 2003 UT App 117 at fl9. "However, [a plea statement]
should be only the starting point, not an end point, in the
pleading process." Id. (citation and quotations omitted). "It
is critical . . . that strict [r]ule 11 compliance be
demonstrated on the record at the time the guilty . . . plea is
entered. Therefore, if [a plea statement] is used to aid [r]ule
11 compliance, it must be addressed during the plea hearing."
Id. (first omission, and first and third alterations in original)
(citations and quotations omitted).
1|14 "The trial court must conduct an inquiry to establish that
the defendant understands the [plea statement] and voluntarily
signed it." Id. (citation and quotations omitted); see also
State v. Maguire, 830 P.2d 216, 217 (Utah 1991) (holding a plea
statement is "properly incorporated in the record" when "the
trial judge ascertains in the plea colloquy that the defendant
has read, has understood, and acknowledges all the information
contained therein"), appeal after remand, 924 P.2d 904 (Utah Ct.
App. 1996), rev'd on other grounds, 957 P.2d 598 (Utah 1998). At
that time, "omissions or ambiguities in the [statement] must be
clarified during the plea hearing, as must any uncertainties
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raised in the course of the plea colloquy." State v. Smith, 812
P.2d 470, 477 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). Thus, "the
efficiency-promoting function of the [plea statement] is thereby
served, in that the court need not repeat, verbatim, rule 11
inquiries that are clearly posed and answered in the [statement],
unless rule 11 by its terms specifically requires such
repetition." Id.
fl5 In this case, the plea statement was not properly
incorporated into the record. During the plea colloquy
concerning her statement, the trial court asked Bluemel only if
she had "any questions about the statement." Bluemel responded
that she did not and was directed by the trial court to sign the
statement. However, the trial court never asked Bluemel if she
actually read, understood, and acknowledged her plea statement.
See Maguire, 83 0 P.2d at 217. Nor did the trial court make any
other similar inquiry. We conclude that this was a critical
error. As a result, "the [statement] was not properly
incorporated into the record, and we may not consider it when
determining whether the record establishes that the trial court
strictly complied with rule 11." State v. Mora, 2003 UT App
117,1(20, 69 P.3d 838.
fl6 In reviewing the plea colloquy (exclusive of the plea
statement) in this matter, the trial court failed to inform
Bluemel of all of the rule 11(e) factors and rights. See Utah R.
Crim. P. 11(e). Specifically, the trial court failed to inform
Bluemel of her "right to the presumption of innocence," that the
State carried the burden of proving her guilty "beyond a
reasonable doubt," that her "plea is an admission of all those
elements," and that she had the "right to compel the attendance
of defense witnesses." Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(3), (4)(A). As a
result, the trial court erred by not fully complying with rule 11
in this matter.
iflV Additionally, because noncompliance with rule 11 infringes
on the constitutional rights of the accused, see State v.
Stilling, 856 P.2d 666, 671 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), we conclude
that noncompliance with rule 11 readily falls within the
interests-of-justice exception under the PCRA, see Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-35a-107(3). As a result, the trial court erred by
dismissing Bluemel1s petition for post-conviction relief.
CONCLUSION
fl8 We conclude that the plea statement was not properly
incorporated into the record and that the trial court did not
sufficiently conduct a rule 11 colloquy with Bluemel. As a
result, Bluemel's circumstances qualified under the interests-of-
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justice exception to the PCRA and the trial court erred by
dismissing her petition. We therefore reverse and remand for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Ru¥stllW~Bench,
Presiding Judge
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